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Rune Graulund
The Hegemony of the Copy: 
The Manuscript, the Book, and 
the Electronic Text in the Age 
of Limitless Digital Storage
Abstract This essay questions when the creative process leading to 
the original can be said to be complete. When does the series of a pupil’s 
botched attempts at perfection leading to “the” singular and unique ob-
ject, text, tool, or artwork we recognise as the original expression of the 
master craftsman stop? Where is the cut-off point between the different 
versions (copies) of earlier inferior iterations in the gestation process that 
lead to the original, and final, superior original? This essay chiefly exam-
ines the manner in which text has been copied and stored in one particular 
type of object, namely that of the book, in order to provide some fairly 
well-known arguments regarding pre-mechanical as well as mechanical re-
production. In particular, it examines the differences between manuscript 
culture and print culture as we see them expressed in the production (and 
reproduction) of master copies and subsequent copies, of handwritten 
manuscripts, and mechanically printed books. Finally, it asks what the im-
pact of digital memory and digital copying has had in terms of our current 
conception of copy and original and, in particular, examines the manner in 
which an increase in memory storage capacity can be seen to go hand in 
hand with digitisation’s increased role in diluting the differences between 
original and copy—not only in the excessive copying of the original, but 
in the creative process itself. For in a world in which objects, information, 
and text can be copied cheaply in vast quantities, and to a degree of verisi-
militude that even the creator of such may no longer know the difference, 
does it make sense to speak of a distinction between the two any longer? 
Has the copy turned original, and the original turned copy? How do we 
discern between the two in a world in which all “copies,” the master copy 
as well as copies of the master copy, are indiscernible?
Keywords Artefact, aura, authenticity, book, copy, deletion, forgetting, 
frailty, manuscript, memory, mimesis, original, replica, safekeeping, text
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In his seminal study “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduc-
tion,” Walter Benjamin begins by the admission that “in principle, a work 
of art has always been reproducible.”1 As long as there have been art and 
craft, Benjamin explains, there have been attempts at trying to capture the 
essence of the original, of replicating the outstanding quality of the work 
of a master craftsman or a genius artist. Indeed, in the very pursuit of the 
eventual perfection of skill required to create a master artefact worthy to 
be copied by others, all master craftsmen and genius artists will them-
selves have had to go through endless repetitive acts of copying in order to 
attain the experience necessary for the production of the master copy that 
others would then themselves desire to imitate and replicate.
In this, in the arduous process leading to the supposed perfection and 
completion of an original master artefact, the superior original from which 
all subsequent, and subsequently inferior, copies are to compare them-
selves, we see the root question of the argument which is to follow. I will 
in general terms be working towards an examination of some fundamen-
tal questions pertaining to the relationship between copy and original, as 
to the creative act leading up to the supposedly complete unique object 
we term “original.” The questions to be asked, and hopefully answered, 
are therefore as follows: When can the process leading to the original be 
said to be complete? Where is the cut-off point between different versions 
(copies) of earlier, inferior iterations in the gestation process leading to the 
original, and final, superior original?
Obviously, any attempt at answering such questions fully would consti-
tute a Herculean task. Consequently, what I intend to do in the following 
is to pose some broad questions regarding the tangled and often highly 
confusing relationship of copy with original, but to do so through an anal-
ysis of a selective range of material. In this, I intend to give an overview 
of at least some (but by no means all) of the general challenges posed by 
pre-mechanical as well as mechanical reproduction. The main thrust of the 
argument, however, points towards a discussion of the digital techniques 
of reproduction, the introduction of which have led to a revolution not only 
in the price and accuracy of copying, but to a questioning of some of the 
basic questions regarding the relationship between copy and original. Nev-
ertheless, while I am admittedly interested in querying these questions in 
fairly broad terms, I have picked most of my examples from one particular 
medium, namely text. Furthermore, I will be looking chiefly at the manner 
in which text has been copied and stored in one particular type of object, 
namely that of the book, in order to provide some fairly well-known argu-
ments regarding pre-mechanical as well as mechanical reproduction. In 
particular, I will be looking at the differences between manuscript culture 
and print culture as we see it expressed in the production, and reproduc-
tion, of master copies, and subsequent copies, of handwritten manuscripts 
and mechanically printed books.
1 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 212.
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In the final section, as we move up to present day, I will however once 
more move away from the question of text and the object of the book 
in order to query the questions of digital memory and digital copying in 
terms broader than those of text and the book. In particular, I want to 
examine the impact this relatively new technology has had on our cur-
rent conception of copy and original, as well as the relationship between 
them. Returning to the initial question posed above regarding the process 
leading up to the supposed complete and final state of the authentic orig-
inal, I will be looking at the manner in which an increase in memory stor-
age capacity can be seen to go hand in hand with digitisation’s increased 
role in diluting the differences between original and copy, not only in the 
excessive copying of the original, but in the creative process itself. For in 
a world in which objects, information, and text can be copied cheaply, in 
vast quantities, and to such a degree of verisimilitude that even the crea-
tor may no longer know the difference, does it make sense to speak of a 
distinction between the two any longer? Has the copy turned original, and 
the original turned copy? How do we discern between the two in a world 
in which all “copies,” master copy as well as copies of the master copy, are 
indescernible?
Mimesis, copy, text, and book
In literary studies, the conundrum of original and copy are as old as the 
discipline itself. Indeed, language, the base subject matter from which lit-
erature, oral as well as written, originates, is to some extent defined by 
this troubled relationship between original and copy through concerns 
regarding the notion of “mimesis.” The question of mimesis, of putting a 
mirror to nature, is of great importance to all forms of art and not just of 
language and literature. As Plato argued in The Republic (ca. 380 BC), all art 
rests upon the ability to imitate, to act “as a representation of something 
else.”2 As Matthew Potolsky argues in Mimesis, Plato’s notion of art as copy 
“is so fundamental to the way we understand art that it is no exaggeration 
to claim that art itself, as a distinct human product, is a Platonic inven-
tion.”3 Nevertheless, as Potolsky also makes clear, the very idea of “art” as 
being somehow at a remove from the natural, of art being somehow “arti-
ficial” in that it is of a second order to nature, is a problem that becomes 
compounded several times over once we move from visual artistic rep-
resentations on to language and literature: “The movement from visual to 
linguistic imitation is problematic. Language does not imitate in the same 
ways that images do.”4
2 Potolsky 2006, 15.
3 Potolsky 2006, 16.
4 Potolsky 2006, 26.
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Even in this seemingly simple distinction between visual representa-
tion and textual representation, we begin to encounter a host of prob-
lems. First of all, before we even begin to discuss the differences between 
visual and textual representation, there is the question of exactly what one 
means by “mimesis.” As anthropologist Michael Taussig puts it in Mimesis 
and Alterity, mimesis is a concept that is not easy to pin down and define 
in that it is a process and “a relationship, not a thing in itself.”5 The title of 
Taussig’s study implies as much, for in his claim that “the faculty to copy, 
imitate, make models, explore difference, yield into and become Other,”6 
we see the constant flux mimesis instigates between sameness (copy) and 
alterity (originality). “Pulling you this way and that, mimesis plays this trick 
of dancing between the very same and the very different. An impossible 
but necessary, indeed an everyday affair, mimesis registers both sameness 
and difference, of being like, and of being Other.”7 As Gunther Gebauer 
and Christoph Wulf conclude in Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society,8 to ask the 
question “what is mimesis?” is therefore asking the wrong question. Such 
a question, they propose, inevitably “leads to error [in that it] presupposes 
that mimesis is a largely homogenous concept that undergoes continu-
ous development in a historical space.” Rather, they suggest, we should 
consider mimesis “a highly complex structure in which an entire range of 
conditions coincide.”9
Taking up Gebauer and Wulf’s admonition, I too will refrain from any 
attempt to pin down an exact definition of what mimesis may or may not 
be. What I do intend to do in the following, however, is to take a closer look 
at the manner in which one specific process of mimetic behaviour, namely 
that of copying, has been theorised in one specific discipline, namely that 
of literary studies. In particular, I will be looking at the manner in which the 
vehicle through which literary meaning was, at least until fairly recently, 
usually carried. I am referring, of course, to the book.
In a discussion regarding the relationship between original and copy, 
the book has certain advantages over “language” or “text.” Unlike a letter, 
a word, a sentence, or a paragraph, the book is, or at least it was until fairly 
recently, a tangible object. While we may arguably also encounter words 
and sentence written down on a page, which is to say on physical matter, 
and while we may indeed also discuss the book in abstract terms (the idea 
of the book), at least the first couple of thousand years of the history of 
the book largely focussed on tangible physical objects consisting of paper, 
glue, cardboard, leather, ink, and so on. Accordingly, at least for our intro-
ductory argument, it is simpler to view the book in terms of a physical 
entity that can undergo various stages of copying and reproduction.
5 Taussig 1993, 130.
6 Taussig 1993, xiii.
7 Taussig 1993, 129.
8 Gebauer and Wulf (1992) 1995.
9 Gebauer and Wulf (1992) 1995, 309.
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Pre-mechanical reproduction: Manuscript, frailty, 
and safekeeping
The history of the book is long, complex, and contested. From Lucien Febvre 
and Henri-Jean Martin’s The Coming of the Book to Marshall McLuhan’s The 
Gutenberg Galaxy on to Walter Ong’s Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing 
of the Word, a range of influential thinkers have attempted to chart the 
history and influence of the book from its early origins and up until pres-
ent day.10 The impact of the book is momentous, book historians agree. 
Yet they do not always see eye to eye as to what the exact impact of the 
book may have been. Similarly, there is some confusion as to what exactly 
we may usefully term a “book” in the first place, a distinction that has not 
exactly been made easier by the fact that we are now seemingly living in 
“the late age of print.”11 Accordingly, whereas book historians could for-
merly at least agree on the fact that the book was a physical object, even 
this quality is now rapidly fading with the introduction of various forms of 
e-books, novel digital text formats, and so on.
While there is some uncertainty as to how far we need to go back in
history in order to encounter the first book,12 most book historians tend to 
agree that the book underwent a major change once print and print tech-
nologies were introduced. Obviously, this is a distinction of some impor-
tance when we have Benjamin’s concept of mechanical reproduction in 
mind. Indeed, the difference between manuscript culture and print culture 
is one of Benjamin’s first examples of the transformation brought about by 
mechanical reproduction.
Written and illustrated by hand, manuscripts differ significantly from 
printed books in that a considerable amount of time and energy must be 
invested in their production, as well as in their re-production. The original 
manuscript of a given text, the very first version penned by one or sev-
eral authors, would have taken a long time to produce, not only in terms 
of the creative process, but in the actual process of producing the first 
physical manuscript. Similarly, the subsequent reproductions of those 
original manuscripts required a great deal of expenditure. As Febvre and 
Martin point out in The Coming of the Book, the claim that “the production 
of a single book involved a colossal amount of work” may at times have 
been stressed too strongly,13 but there can be no doubt that there was a 
world of difference between the world of manuscripts produced by hand 
and the world of print. Indeed, if “the technique of reproduction detaches 
the reproduced object from the domain of tradition [and that by] mak-
ing many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique 
10 Febvre and Martin (1958) 1998; McLuhan (1962) 1997; Ong (1982) 2000.
11 Striphas (2009) 2011.
12 E.g. whether scrolls, papyrus, clay tablets, runestones, and so on should be 
included in the history of the book or relegated to an earlier period. 
13 Febvre and Martin (1958) 1998, 27.
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existence,”14 it should be obvious that the ability of print to reproduce the 
written word over and over again, and at a massive reduction in energy 
and cost, puts the printed book at a “colossal” remove from the handwrit-
ten manuscript.15
Now Benjamin famously bemoaned the arrival of mechanical repro-
duction due to the fact that it helped undermine the “aura” of a work of art 
and lead to “a tremendous shattering of tradition.”16 As Benjamin argues, 
the “authenticity” of the original is therefore eventually eroded, to the 
point where there is hardly any trace left of the original in the mechani-
cally reproduced copy. Mechanical reproduction technologies like printing 
may therefore have enacted an erasure of “all that is transmissible from 
[the original’s] beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testi-
mony to the history which it has experienced,” hence diluting the “essence” 
of the original.17 We will return to this dilution of aura below, when we 
engage with the question of digitization. For now, though, the lack of easily 
reproduced copies eventually enabled by mechanical reproduction poses 
another question regarding the question of original and copy, and that is 
the questions posed by frailty and safekeeping. Ironically, the very rarity 
that Benjamin and others would bemoan the loss of in the age of mechan-
ical reproduction is precisely also the Achilles heel of what Benjamin terms 
“artifacts.”18 Namely, that they are unique and therefore do not, by defini-
tion, exist in any great numbers (indeed that they do not exist in numbers, 
plural, at all); hence they are highly likely to perish. 
The Italian semiotician, philosopher, literary scholar, and novelist 
Umberto Eco has written widely on original and copy, manuscript and print 
culture, and language and mimesis. One text in particular stands out in 
regard to the discussion presented here, though, and that is his novel Il 
nome della rosa. Subsequently translated into English as The Name of The 
Rose, the novel remains Eco’s most well-known work, not least due to the 
fact that the book was later, in 1986, adapted into a highly popular film 
of the same name.19 Novel as well as film revolve around a deceptively 
straightforward murder mystery in a fourteenth century monastery. It 
soon evolves beyond this fairly simple premise, though, to take on a wide 
range of philosophical, theological, textual, and cultural conundrums. 
While many of Eco’s themes in The Name of The Rose touch on questions 
of copy and original, one plot point in particular is of relevance for our 
discussion of copy, manuscript culture, frailty, and safekeeping. For, as it 
turns out, the murders committed at the monastery can all in some way or 
14 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 215.
15 Febvre and Martin (1958) 1998.
16 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 215.
17 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 215.
18 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 212.
19 Used for citations in this paper is an edition published in 1986 (Eco [1980] 1986). 
The original Italian version of the novel was published in 1980. The first English 
edition was published in 1983.
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other be traced back to the resurfacing of a copy of a book the world has 
for centuries presumed lost. The second part of Aristotle’s Poetics (ca. 335 
BCE), The Book of Comedy, previously believed to have been lost to human-
ity, is discovered to still exist, a single copy of the book having somehow 
been safely kept in the labyrinthine library of the monastery. Indeed, as 
the two protagonists of the book, Adso and William, eventually discover, 
the murders in the monastery can all be attributed to the existence of this 
one copy of a text that had supposedly perished.
The central plot around which the book revolves thus turns out to be a 
question of copy and original, original idea, and subsequent dissemination 
of such through the physical copy of a handwritten manuscript. Specifi-
cally, the murders in the monastery have all—in some way or another—
been orchestrated by the blind head librarian Jorge, a man who will go to 
any length to prevent what he considers to be a dangerous text falling into 
the wrong hands. Indeed, so bent is Jorge on barring access to Aristotle’s 
text that he has, at the end of the novel, managed not only to destroy the 
copy of the book itself, but also the entire library in which it was stored. As 
a librarian, then, which is to say as a custodian (safe-keeper) of books, Jorge 
fails miserably, a fact that is mirrored in terms of plot by his own demise as 
he perishes alongside his library as it all goes up in flames. At the end of 
The Name of The Rose, the one extant copy of Aristotle’s The Book of Comedy, 
presumed to have been lost for centuries only to have been temporarily 
rediscovered, has once again been wiped from the face of the earth.
Through Eco’s swashbuckling tale of detective monks, burning librar-
ies, and grisly murder, we are offered a telling parable on the frailty of 
the copy in the age of non-mechanical reproduction. Before the age of 
mechanical reproduction, manuscripts existed in one copy only, or at 
most in a couple handfuls of copies. Accordingly, as was the case with 
Aristotle’s The Book of Comedy, many texts have been lost forever because 
the only copy in existence at one point or other disappeared, or was, as 
it is the case in The Name of the Rose, wilfully destroyed.20 In addition to 
being a murder mystery, a meditation on religion, and a philosophical 
musing on the state of literature, language, and laughter, Eco’s novel is 
therefore also a piece of alternative history, albeit one that ultimately 
leads to a state of affairs resembling the history we are already familiar 
with. How different the world would have looked, Eco suggest, and how 
different Christianity, had the world possessed a copy of Aristotle’s con-
troversial The Book of Comedy. His two monks-cum-detectives work tire-
lessly to solve the crime and gain possession of the book in order for the 
truth to come out so as to challenge the hegemony of church dogma. Yet 
20 The writings of Plato, for instance—documents that would prove so vital to 
Western civilization—were for a time believed to have been lost, until it was 
discovered that copies of his writings had in fact survived, safely tucked away 
in Constantinople. Without such extra copies, Western philosophy would have 
looked very different today. One could have wished, too, that more copies of 
Aristotle’s works had been made.
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in the end, with the library and the book gone up in flames, they end up, 
towards the close of the novel, without proof. Without actual copies of 
Aristotle’s work, they are helpless to effect change. All they have left is “a 
library made up of fragments, quotations, unfinished sentences, ampu-
tated stumps of books.”21
We do not, of course, have access to any copy of Aristotle’s work on 
comedy. Indeed, like Eco’s protagonists, we possess only fragments. We 
know of Aristotle’s second book from mention of it in other sources, of 
short passages that have survived more or less intact in other texts, of 
summaries of what the book was supposed to have been about, and so on 
and so forth; as for any actual copies, though, original or otherwise, they 
have long ago been lost. Eco’s novel therefore reminds us of the impor-
tance of preserving the original as best we can: to copy it as widely and as 
flawlessly as we possibly can so as to preserve it for future generations. 
Because the copy, of course, is to some extent intended as a means of 
safekeeping. A reading of The Name of the Rose could therefore be that 
hegemonies will prefer to destroy dangerous information, or dangerous 
copies, rather than let it fall into the wrong hands and let their authority 
be challenged. Another important lesson to be learned here, though, is 
that copies are an excellent means of safeguarding the original, and also 
that, prior to the age of mechanical reproduction, copies were frail things 
simply because they were so difficult to produce in great numbers. 
Mechanical reproduction: Print, numbers, and aura
The problem facing Eco’s protagonists in The Name of the Rose is of course 
an obsolete problem. No longer do we need to worry about the disappear-
ance of all single copies of a given text, or at least not of the very important 
ones. It is rare in the age of mechanical reproduction that books disappear 
altogether. Various repressive political systems have tried, as did Jorge 
(a representative of Church dogma) in The Name of the Rose, to repress 
particular books. Since the introduction and dissemination of mechan-
ical reproduction of text via the printing press, however, such attempts 
of silencing dissenting voices have, generally speaking, met with limited 
success. Accordingly, while we may to some extent have lost the Benja-
minian “aura” and the “authenticity” of uniquely handcrafted artefacts like 
the manuscript, at least we now possess the major works of literature in 
seemingly indestructible numbers. Barring some sort of earth shattering 
cataclysmic event, it is highly unlikely that each and every copy of, say, 
Dante Alighieri’s Divine Comedy (ca. 1308–1321) or William Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet (ca. 1599–1602) would be lost forever. Accordingly, while the shift 
from manuscript culture to print culture may be said to have eroded tradi-
tion and the particularity of craftsmanship, at least it has given us safety in 
21 Eco (1980) 1986, 291.
113
THE HEGEMONY OF THE COPY
numbers. Never again will a central document like The Book of Comedy be 
lost forever to flames, floods, or censorship. 
The problem I want to address in the following, however, is one of num-
bers as much as of fidelity. After all, how many copies does one need? What 
is the point at which copying the original for safekeeping tips and becomes 
overwhelming? Is there a finely balanced point between safeguarding the 
essence of the original so that future generations too may gain access to 
it, and that of a countless repetition of the original that somehow corrupts 
and diminishes it? Also, does a copy need to be an exact copy of the origi-
nal or can it be something in-between? What is the difference between an 
imperfect imitation of the original, as indeed all acts of craftsmanship must 
ultimately be, and that of the perfect copy one cannot distinguish from the 
original? Finally, and this is of course vital for Benjamin’s argument, what 
is the point at which increasing orders of copying, as of the increasingly 
accurate degrees of fidelity to the original, will impact the value—and the 
meaning—not only of the copy, but of the original itself? Once again, the 
object of the book, the original and its copy, may help us consider such 
questions in further detail.
The quality of the copy in the age of the manuscript was never perfect. 
As Ong points out in Orality and Literacy, “manuscripts, with their glosses or 
marginal comments (which often got worked into the text in subsequent 
copies)” were a constant process, a “dialogue” with the original rather than 
an exact and definite copy of it.22 With the age of print, however, the relation-
ship between original and copy changed. For while it will arguably always 
be possible to detect some sort of anomaly in a given print copy of a book, 
to anyone but the expert, copies of the same edition will in practice seem 
interchangeable. The print version of the first 1983 English translation of 
Eco’s The Name of the Rose, for instance, will seem to be indistinguishable 
from the first, the fifth, or the fiftieth copy to any standard reader. While, 
in the time of the manuscript, various techniques and regulations were 
already in place in order for copies to be “scrupulously checked for textual 
correctness so that no errors may slip in, distorting the sense,” there were 
nevertheless much greater risk of a “corruption of the text” prior to the 
invention of mechanical reproduction of text.23 The further we move into 
the age of mechanical reproduction, though, and the more the techniques 
of reproduction perfect the process of producing the perfect copy, we see 
an increasing concern that the ability to produce ever better, and ever 
more copies, may in fact itself act as a source of corruption.
The second parable from the world of literature illustrates this conun-
drum pointedly. Published the year after Eco’s Il nome della rosa had been 
translated into English in 1983, American novelist Don DeLillo’s White 
Noise addressed similar questions of copy and original, the fake and the 
22 Ong (1982) 2000, 130.
23 Febvre and Martin (1958) 1998, 21.
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authentic, and appearance and aura.24 Like Eco’s protagonists, DeLillo’s Jack 
Gladney, a college professor in a nondescript college town somewhere in 
a nondescript part of North America, is concerned about authenticity and 
originality. Unlike Eco’s monks, however, Jack is not on a quest to expose 
deceit and fallacy. On the contrary, Jack is himself somewhat of a poser. 
Which is to say a person posing as something he is not, hence a person ter-
rified of being ex-posed. As director of Hitler Studies at College-on-the-Hill, 
Jack is arguably in a position of power that legitimises him as an authentic 
Hitler scholar. What is more, as the man who in fact invented the discipline 
of Hitler Studies in the first place, he is also, as the wellspring and origi-
nal creative source of the discipline itself, the originator of all other Hitler 
scholars. Compared to other Hitler scholars, Jack can therefore be said to 
be the real deal, the original, the authentic and unique superior ideal to 
which all inferior Hitler scholars must compare themselves unfavourably.
Yet Jack suffers from a major defect as a Hitler scholar: he does not 
know German. As the novel progresses, Jack desperately tries to remedy 
this imperfection by taking German lessons, but he never quite manages 
to get it right. “I had long tried to conceal the fact that I did not know Ger-
man,” Jack remarks to the reader, which has been troublesome enough 
due to the stipulation (presumably Jack’s own) that “no one could major in 
Hitler studies at the College-on-the-Hill without a minimum of one year of 
German.”25 Ironically, and somewhat absurdly, the director and inventor of 
Hitler Studies, the man who requires that his students learn German so as 
to be properly versed in their subject, is himself ignorant of the language 
he is supposed to be an expert in. At the beginning of the novel, while 
living precariously “on the edge of a landscape of vast shame,” Jack has 
still successfully managed to hide this deficiency, and this despite the fact 
that “I could not speak or read it, could not understand the spoken word 
or begin to put the simplest sentence on paper.”26 Yet Jack is a haunted 
man, well aware of the eventual end of his masquerade as he is about to 
host a Hitler conference: “Three days of lectures, workshops and panels. 
Hitler scholars from seventeen states and nine foreign countries. Actual 
Germans would be in attendance.”27 Jack the poser, the man always afraid 
of being ex-posed, is about to have the rug pulled out from under him 
by the real deal, actual Germans who can speak actual German, and who 
threaten to prove the originator of Hitler Studies the fraud he really is.
White Noise is brimming over with juxtapositions of deceptive surfaces 
and inner truths, copy and original, authenticity and fakery. One scene in 
particular, however, is of particular importance to the questions posed 
here. Murray Jay Siskind, a colleague of Jack’s, invites Jack to accompany 
24 The 1999 edition was used for the citations in this essay (DeLillo [1984] 1999). 
The book was originally published in 1984. 
25 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 31.
26 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 31.
27 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 33.
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him to the tourist attraction “The most photographed barn in Ameri-
ca.”28 In one sense, the barn is a standard tourist attraction in that it has 
achieved the status of being a tourist attraction through the process all 
other tourist attractions undergo.29 Yet it is different from older, more tra-
ditional types of tourist attractions like the Eiffel Tower, The Empire State 
Building, or the pyramids in that it possesses no immediate quality that dif-
ferentiates it from other examples (copies) of its general type. Indeed, the 
barn is exactly like all other barns but for the fact that it is “the most pho-
tographed.” The barn itself, then, the particular object, is not particular at 
all. It is only through its mediation, through the mechanically reproduced 
photographs of the barn, that it gains meaning as a tourist destination.
Unremarkable as it may seem, the barn is however the ultimate mani-
festation of touristic logic, which is at heart all about copy and reproduction. 
For unlike the Eiffel Tower, The Empire State Building, or the pyramids, all 
of which have become tourist attractions due the fact that they are archi-
tectural and engineering wonders as well as being extremely large, the 
barn possess no unique qualities whatsoever, but for the fact that other 
tourists have verified its existence by mediating it via photographs. The 
barn is neither the largest nor the smallest barn, the most peculiar, or the 
greenest or reddest or bluest of barns. Its quality as a tourist attraction 
relies solely on the fact that other tourists have been here to verify its exist-
ence via that most Benjaminian of mechanical reproductive techniques, 
the camera. Consequently, Murray argues, it has become impossible to 
see the barn itself any longer:
“No one sees the barn,” he said finally.
A long silence followed.
“Once you’ve seen the signs about the barn, it becomes impos-
sible to see the barn.”
He fell silent once more. People with cameras left the elevated 
site, replaced by others.
“We’re not here to capture an image, we’re here to maintain one. 
Every photograph reinforces the aura. Can you feel it, Jack? An accu-
mulation of nameless energies.”
There was an extended silence. The man in the booth sold post-
cards and slides.
“Being here is a kind of spiritual surrender. We see only what 
the others see. The thousands who were here in the past, those 
who will come in the future. We’ve agreed to be part of a collective 
perception. It literally colors our vision. A religious experience in a 
way, like all tourism.”
28 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 12. Tellingly, Murray befriends Jack because he wishes to 
copy Jack’s supposed (yet hollow) success by establishing his own original field 
of study by becoming an expert on Elvis.
29 For more on this, see Dean MacCannell’s The Tourist ([1976] 1999) or John Urry’s 
The Tourist Gaze ([1990] 1998). 
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Another silence ensued.
“They are taking pictures of taking pictures,” he said.
He did not speak for a while. We listened to the incessant click-
ing of shutter release buttons, the rustling crank of levers that 
advanced the film.
“What was the barn like before it was photographed?” he said. 
“What did it look like, how was it different from the other barns, how 
was it similar to other barns?”30
Significantly, Murray argues the very opposite of Benjamin here. “Every 
photograph reinforces the aura,” Murray remarks, in effect claiming that, 
rather than detracting from aura, rather than to “wither” it down,31 pho-
tographing the barn over and over again “reinforces” its aura. Arguably, 
Murray and Benjamin likely do not mean quite the same thing when they 
speak of “aura.” Yet the paradoxical chicken and egg conundrum posed by 
Murray (Why was the barn first photographed? When did it change from 
being simply a barn to being the most photographed barn? What was the 
barn like before it became known for being the most photographed barn 
in America?) leads him to some interesting observations regarding copy 
and original that Benjamin’s essay tends to elide. As Murray points out, the 
problem is that the “authenticity,” the “uniqueness,” and the “aura” of the 
original barn no longer exists since the quality of “The most photographed 
barn in America” identifying it as such relies solely on its relation to all 
other copies like it, to all other barns, and to the reproductions of such 
barns through the technology of photography. Not only is the barn a tour-
ist destination precisely because it is not original, in that it is a standard 
and utterly typical manifestation (copy) of a certain type of building, a barn 
that is “in itself,” as a type, as unremarkable and typical as buildings go. It 
is also a tourist destination because this very unremarkable type has been 
copied over and over and over again in reproductions that look exactly, or 
at least almost exactly, alike.
It is telling that, unlike Benjamin, Murray sees nothing in this to be 
worried about. For if Benjamin’s 1936 essay points to some of the basic 
problems facing modernity, and in particular modernism, in the face of 
an almost perfect reproduction that can be reproduced many times over, 
DeLillo’s 1984 text exemplifies the postmodern conundrum of entering a 
world in which there is no recourse to the original left, not even as Benja-
minian nostalgia. As such, the problem confronting Jack and Murray is, in a 
sense, the problem facing Benjamin squared. How was it different from the 
other barns, how was it similar to other barns” is no longer the question, 
really. The real, and only question, is now that of the copy itself. A copy that 
has been repeated so many times there is nothing left but the copy itself. 
The original, if there ever were one, has long since been forgotten.
30 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 12–13.
31 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 215.
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Digitisation I: Copy and cost, memory and deletion
As we have entered the digital age, the question of craftsmanship as well 
as of mechanical reproduction seems to have retreated further and further 
into history. Here, then, we are about to complete the journey that has 
taken us from the techniques of pre-mechanical reproduction, to mechan-
ical reproduction, and all the way up to post-mechanical techniques. The 
latter, as we saw it hinted at in DeLillo’s White Noise, may perhaps be said 
not to be “reproductive” at all, simply because the very notion of an authen-
tic original disappears somewhere in the process of copies being taken of 
copies of other copies. Hence, as we shall see in the following, the ability to 
produce almost perfect copies, and in seemingly infinite numbers, can blur 
the distinction between original and copy to such an extent that we can no 
longer tell the two apart.
If the late age of mechanical reproduction as it is parodied in novels 
like DeLillo’s White Noise seemed about to effect this transition, we would 
have to wait for the age of digitisation, I would argue, before we would 
truly see this come into effect. As I will demonstrate in the following, digital 
(re)production is radically different from both pre-mechanical and mechan-
ical reproduction in that it has provided us with the capability to document 
every single stage of the creative process that leads to whatever it is we 
consider to be the unique (singular, authentic, or auratic) master copy we 
classify as being “the original.” Digital (re)production is also different from 
all former reproductive techniques, as will become clear, in that it is the 
first reproductive technique that can produce one hundred per cent exact 
copies of the original.
As a technique, there can be little question that digital reproduction is, 
in and of itself, radically different from mechanical and non-mechanical 
reproductive techniques. The question in this and the following section, 
however, is whether this revolutionary technology has introduced a new 
state of affairs in terms of the manner in which original relates to copy and 
vice versa. Or whether, as may also be the case, that digital (re)production 
has simply made clear what should perhaps have been obvious all along; 
namely, that we may in fact never been able to tell the two, copy and orig-
inal, clearly apart.
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, whose book Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting 
in the Digital Age presents us with some useful observations on this conun-
drum.32 As I will attempt to show in the following, the core argument put 
forth by Mayer-Schönberger regarding copy, memory, and forgetting has 
significant importance for both abstract and specific claims made in the 
above regarding both physical and philosophical aspects of the book as 
copy as well as original.
The prime object of Delete, as stated on the book’s cover, is to provide 
an analysis and a survey of the “phenomenon of perfect remembering in 
32 Mayer-Schönberger 2009.
118 
RUNE GRAULUND
the digital age.” What happens, Mayer-Schönberger asks, once “forgetting 
has become the exception, and remembering the default?”33 In this , he 
argues, we are witnessing a revolution in the manner in which we deal 
with information, such that we are entering an age in which, for the first 
time in human history, forgetting has required greater expenditure than 
remembering.
In the past, Mayer-Schönberger claims, memory was special. In oral 
societies, those who were especially good at remembering were consid-
ered to possess exceptional gifts. Later, as script was invented, an invention 
that “fundamentally changed our human capacity to preserve information 
and enhance our recollection,”34 the wonder at superior individual memory 
subsided somewhat. Nevertheless, the “admiration for superior human 
memory continued into the Middle Ages and persists in modern times.”35 
We are still be awed by individuals who can remember, say, the sequence 
of an entire deck of cards after just a few minutes, or the first thousand 
digits of pi. The difference between now and then, however, is that such 
memory has little practical application. There is no real need, after all, to 
remember a thousand, one hundred, or even ten digits of pi when the 
cheapest of calculators can do it for us at the single push of a button.
As the technologies of script developed further, information could be 
stored in greater and greater amounts, and at increasingly lower costs. In 
the time that manuscript culture had developed into the sort of assem-
bly lines one sees in, for instance, the medieval monasteries in which the 
plot of Eco’s The Name of the Rose unfolds, the cost of storing information 
dropped markedly. Nevertheless, even as we move past early organised 
pre-mechanical reproductive processes of the kind seen in medieval mon-
asteries, up to and beyond the introduction of print technologies, and all 
the way to the invention of a whole new range of media and reproductive 
techniques in the age of Benjamin, “fundamentally remembering remained 
expensive.”36 Compared to the painstaking time and costs of producing a 
manuscript, when it could take a scribe several years to produce a single 
copy, it may have been one hundred, a thousand, perhaps even ten-thou-
sand times cheaper to produce a paperback book by the time Benjamin 
published his essay. And yet for all their apparent differences in expendi-
ture, both these objects, both these types of copies, share with one another 
the fact that it cost more to remember than it did to forget. It may have 
been cheap to produce copies in the early twentieth century, but it was 
never free. “Until recently, […] remembering has always been a little bit 
harder than forgetting.”37
In this, we are today are faced with an unprecedented revolution in 
information technology, Mayer-Schönberger claims, so that it is only 
33 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 2.
34 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 34.
35 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 28.
36 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 39.
37 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 49.
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recently that “remembering has become the norm, and forgetting the 
exception.”38 As we see it exemplified via the concerns expressed by Benja-
min, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw a rapid increase 
in the ability to provide ever more and ever cheaper copies. The further 
we move through the twentieth century, as exemplified by the parody pro-
vided by DeLillo’s characters, this tendency only increased as mechanical 
reproduction became ever more refined and optimised and new—and even 
cheaper—technologies became available. Yet even so, as Mayer-Schön-
berger makes clear, the ability to store information, to produce, store and 
distribute copies, was fundamentally different than it is today: 
There is no question that the amount of information people cap-
tured and committed to various types of external memory drasti-
cally increased over the last quarter century, but in the analog age, 
effective remembering was still complex and time-consuming, and 
thus costly. Remembering still remained quite a bit harder than 
forgetting.39
In the digital age, this is however no longer the case, a fact that Mayer- 
Schönberger argues through what he terms “the economics of storage.” 
Tellingly, as was the case with Benjamin and DeLillo, Mayer-Schönberger 
likewise decides to illustrate this shift with an example chosen from 
photography:
The truth is that the economics of storage have made forgetting bru-
tally expensive. Consider digital cameras: When you connect your 
camera to your computer to upload the images you took into your 
hard disk, you are usually given a choice. You can either select which 
images to upload, or have you computer copy automatically all 
images from you cameras. Reassured perhaps by the soothing idea 
that one can always go through them later and delete the images 
one does not like, invariably most people choose the latter option.40
There is a significant difference, here, though, between the photography 
of Benjamin’s early twentieth century photography, as well as DeLillo late 
twentieth century phenomenon of tourists snapping away, reproducing, 
and reifying “The most photographed barn in America” over and over again.
The difference between the mechanical reproductive techniques dis-
cussed by Benjamin and employed by DeLillo’s characters on the one 
hand, and that of Mayer-Schönberger’s digital reproductive technique 
on the other, is that nothing is lost in the former. For while mechanically 
reproduced photographs would become better and better in the period 
38 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 52.
39 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 48.
40 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 68.
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between Benjamin’s essay and DeLillo’s novel, the digitally reproduced 
photographs referred to by Mayer-Schönberger are fundamentally differ-
ent in that they cost us nothing, or almost nothing, and that we have the 
storage capacity to keep an almost infinite amount of them. A photograph, 
once a costly commodity that would take time and money to develop, and 
usually only available in quantities of 24 or 36 per roll of film, now takes up 
just a couple of megabytes of storage, with standard memory cards able 
to stock a thousand or more and at negligible cost (and with standard hard 
drives able to easily store hundreds of thousands of such images). Mem-
ory, and therefore also copying, have become cheap. So cheap, in fact, that 
forgetting has grown costlier than remembering.
Digitisation II: Perfect replicas and total recall
“Four main technological drivers have facilitated this shift: digitization, 
cheap storage, easy retrieval, and global reach,” says Mayer-Schönberg-
er.41 Of these, the first two have substantial impact on the manner in which 
we view the relationship between original and copy, especially in regards 
of quality and quantity. Accordingly, I will deal here only with the first two, 
digitisation and cheap storage.
First of all, we need to take a closer look at digitisation and the question 
of quality, similarity, and exactitude. Whether in text, image, or sound, dig-
itisation is different from analogue copying, Mayer-Schönberger claims, 
because we can now, for the first time ever, make an “exact replica; every 
bit is the exact copy of the original. Hundreds of generations of copies of 
copies of the digital original later, the resulting copy is still as perfect as 
the original. Quality does not diminish, and copying carries no penalty.”42
Accordingly, unlike the scribes in Umberto Eco’s scriptorium, copyists 
who copied original works in order to safeguard them, adding in their 
copy ing—whether intentionally or unintentionally—little variations or 
imperfections to these copies , digital copies are exact copies of the orig-
inal. When faced with the original and its copy, it is therefore no longer 
possible to tell the difference between the two.
Arguably, as mechanical reproduction became ever more refined, and 
as we saw it exemplified with DeLillo’s barn, it would become increasingly 
difficult to tell original master copy and copy apart. Yet no matter the 
medium, close scrutiny will always reveal tiny differences between master 
and copy. Or even for that matter between copy and copy. Two analogue 
copies that have been mechanically reproduced from the same master, 
whether that would happen to be a book, a photograph, or a record, are 
never exactly alike. They may be highly similar, which is to say analogous, 
to one another, as they are to the master. But all three objects, Copy 1, 
41 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 52.
42 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 56.
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Copy 2, and Master Copy are really, when scrutinised in detail, slightly 
different from one another. There never was an exact copy made, either 
in the days of pre-mechanical reproduction, or in the age of mechanical 
reproduction.
With digitisation, however, we have now entered the age of the exact 
copy. Accordingly, in the digital age it is no longer a case of diminishing 
returns on the original’s aura. Rather, it is a question of there being no 
diminishment whatsoever, no discernible difference, between original and 
copy in that they are one and the same. Ultimately, then, “the notion of 
originals and copies is rapidly becoming an outdated concept. All digital 
copies are indistinguishable from the original.”43
Secondly, Mayer-Schönberger makes us reconsider the concept of orig-
inal and copy in terms of the question of the process leading to the sup-
posedly final, unique, and authentic state of “the original” itself. While the 
argument I present in the following is not something that Mayer-Schön-
berger’s own argument about memory and data dwell on directly, his anal-
ysis of the influx of cheap storage is rather telling concerning the creative 
process that leads to the production of an “artefact” that we tend to view as 
the unique and final form of “the” original. For just as we are now getting 
used to keeping every single photograph we take rather than deleting the 
ones we do not like, something similar can be said to be the case regarding 
the creative process leading to the formation of “the original.”
Again, however, rather than ushering in a brand new relationship 
between original and copy, digitisation has perhaps helped us see what has 
perhaps always been the case, rather than introduced something which is 
truly novel. Or that is to say, the technologies of digitisation have no doubt, 
as Mayer-Schönberger convincingly argues, fundamentally changed the 
manner in which we copy and store information. Yet in terms of the cen-
tral question of this paper—and indeed of this entire volume, namely of 
the transformative power of the copy—digitisation has cleared the way 
for some basic truths about the relationship between original and copy, as 
well as what these terms mean in isolation. These truths, as I argue in the 
following concluding section, were as valid in the days of Benjamin and the 
photograph as they were in the age of the medieval scriptorium. That is to 
say these are perhaps truths that may have always been valid, but perhaps 
not always so evident.
43 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 60.
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The original and the copy: First, last, and always 
transformative
Allow me one final analogy from the world of literature and (print) books 
before I conclude. I wish here to revisit a famous literary case of the origi-
nal and the copy, namely that of Franz Kafka and his authorship, surely one 
of the most important of the twentieth century.
Famous as he was to become, Kafka enjoyed only a modicum of success 
as a writer in his lifetime. While he managed to get some of his short sto-
ries published, none of his longer works, like the novels Der Prozess (1925), 
Das Schloss (1926) and Amerika (1927), were published while he was still 
alive. Indeed, but for the obstinacy of his close friend Max Brod, they very 
well never would have been, seeing as Kafka had informed Brod that all of 
his unpublished works were to be incinerated. Fortunately, Brod decided 
to ignore this request, subsequently publishing as much as he could make 
sense of from Kafka’s sprawling notes and notebooks. With this example, 
we return to the question posed at the beginning of this paper, namely the 
question of safekeeping and frailty discussed in the section on manuscript 
culture and of the works of Aristotle (partially recovered) and Plato (initially 
thought lost but eventually recovered). To the initial question of somehow 
safeguarding the surviving original copy, we may now add the question of 
the different iterations (plural) leading to the single authentic copy that we, 
at some point, somewhat arbitrarily decide is the authentic and therefore 
unique (singular) copy that constitutes the artefact, or the master copy, 
from which all subsequent copies are made.
Now when Kafka died, all Brod had to rely on for publication were Kaf-
ka’s notes, which is to say handwritten copies of his as yet unpublished 
works. While some of these, especially the shorter works, were more or 
less ready for publication, many of the longer texts remained in a state 
of incompletion. Consequently, it would be up to Brod to decide what to 
leave out and what to leave in as he took it upon himself to arrange for 
publication such literary classics as Der Prozess and Das Schloss, texts which 
have proven of almost incomparable significance to twentieth-century lit-
erature. The irony here, though, is of course that these classics, these truly 
original pieces of literature, the likes of which had never been since before 
or since, only exist in a state of undeniable incompletion. Accordingly, this 
state of incompletion is the only form in which we, the readers, have ever 
known them. Indeed, it is the only state in which they ever have existed. 
Unlike the works of Aristotle or Plato, it is not a case of originals that 
have been lost, but of originals that were never complete. Texts like these 
therefore cannot be said to be authentically original in the usual sense of 
the word, because we have no authority, no author, to sanction them as 
authentic originals. Texts like Der Prozess and Das Schloss therefore exist 
only—and always—as copies and as originals (plural), simply because we 
have no way of verifying what the final version of “the” original, singular, 
was supposed to look like.
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This is where we can tie up the questions put forth at the beginning of 
our argument to the arguments in Delete in terms of the question of digital 
text and digital storage. For what Kafka’s surviving texts and his literary and 
editorial heritage tell us about original and copy, and especially about the 
process leading to the supposed authentic finality of “the original” (singu-
lar), is not dissimilar to the problematizing posed by the breakdown of the 
barrier between original and copy introduced by digitisation as described 
by Mayer-Schönberger. Namely that the distinctions between original and 
copy were never entirely clear; hence we have in fact always needed to see 
the two as being engaged in am interlinked and always transformative pro-
cess that is never quite at rest. Consequently, there never was such a thing 
as “the” original, but only varying versions of a constantly-evolving process. 
What a case like Kafka’s proves is the concept that the original, too, is 
a copy: one copy out of many, of the many stages of the creative process. 
For imagine that every single iteration of Kafka’s creative process had been 
available to us, as indeed it would have been had Kafka used a modern lap-
top to type up his novels, stored various backups on the cloud, occasionally 
transferred parts of it to an external hard drive or to Dropbox, logged them 
on Google’s servers as he sent drafts via email for his friends to read, and 
so on. If every randomly-jotted note, every daily—nay, hourly—correction 
to his manuscripts was available to us, what would we do? Figuring out the 
original intent and meaning of a work like Das Schloss has already proven 
difficult enough, even without the interfering white noise of digitisation. 
Imagine if we had almost infinite amounts of information available on 
Kafka, almost infinite copies of the various stages of his texts, his thoughts, 
his everyday concerns and problems. Where to begin? Where to quit?
Due to the proliferation of digital memory now available, and the inces-
sant hoarding of information, it would at least in theory be possible to do 
just that. In and of itself, this is nothing new. Published texts, in digital 
or in printed format, have always existed in different draft versions and 
different copies, before they have been released to the world as the final, 
original edition. At this basic level, there is little or no difference between 
pre-mechanical, mechanical, and digital techniques of producing an orig-
inal. Indeed, the very sense of the revolution in information technology 
that we are now experiencing may not be that revolutionary when viewed 
in light of history. The shift from manuscript culture to print culture that 
Gutenberg ushered in by the fifteenth century, or for that matter the “mid-
twelfth century [which] was probably the most important watershed in 
medieval European book production” and with “some parallels with the 
information explosion of the twenty-first century,”44 have likely felt as new, 
fresh, and potentially intimidating as digitisation does today.45 Again, when 
44 Hamel 2013, 64.
45 Indeed, as Umberto Eco remarks it in This is Not the End of the Book: “This is not 
a new debate. The invention of printing created the possibility of storing all the 
cultural information one does not wish to be burdened with “in the fridge”—
that is to say in books—whilst knowing that the information could be found 
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viewed on a very basic level, the creative process itself has not at heart 
changed, nor has the relationship changed between original and copy—
regardless of what sort of reproductive technique we have happen to have 
available. What has changed, however, and indisputably so, is the sheer 
amount of information, the amount of copies, available—and the speed at 
which these copies proliferate.
The final lesson taught, then, by this immense proliferation of copies 
into every nook and cranny of our everyday lives, is that the original has never 
been anything but a copy; a copy from one of the many stages of a creative 
process that has no natural, authentic conclusion. The original is not the 
original. The original is a process: a process that, like the copy, is transform-
ative. Whether mechanical or digital reproductions, a handful of crafted 
copies or endlessly-reproducible digital duplicates, whether copies patiently 
constructed by hand or speedily stamped out by a machine, the conclusion 
must inevitably remain the same: Original as well as copy cannot exist in iso-
lation. Original as well as copy are never complete, and never final. Original 
as well as copy are always in process; indeed they are a process.
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